Let’s do it

If there are no objections I would be happy to accept the diff. @speck are your concerns addressed or should we continue discussion / consider other options?

In T15965#20144, @valerio.bozzolan wrote:

What is changing is, that unverified email will not match your unverified email as default, so that should need these 2 clicks manual configs (or, find a way to verify the email)

Yep, manually setting your unverified (and not verifiable) email would still be possible 👍 just two clicks are needed from this kind of pages:

Another edge case: Most of my contributions to Phorge happened as part of my work for Wikimedia. Those commits are under an email address that I no longer have access to, since I am no longer employed at the Wikimedia Foundation.

Take for example this commit that has a default (empty) identity:

"Steal credit" might actually lead to a real issue: If a new user can get themselves identified as an old, trusted, user based on commit history, their changes might not be checked as rigorously by the rest of the team - similar to the XZ Utils backdoor issue, only faster.

Limitation: to steal a commit identity, it must be the default. Sorry I forgot to say.

In T15965#20052, @speck wrote:

What can a malicious user accomplish by claiming unverified email for commits?

What can a malicious user accomplish by claiming unverified email for commits? The idea outlined here sounds right but I’d like to understand what potential harm could be done on its current state, and also whether there’s any legitimate use case for the current behavior.